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1 Abstract
Honest cooperation among individuals in a network
can be achieved in different ways. In online networks
with some kind of central authority, such as Ebay,
Airbnb, etc. honesty is achieved through a repu-
tation system, which is maintained and secured by
the central authority. These systems usually rely on
review mechanisms, through which agents can evalu-
ate the trustworthiness of their interaction partners.
These reviews are stored centrally and are tamper-
proof. In decentralized peer-to-peer networks, en-
forcing cooperation turns out to be more difficult.
One way of approaching this problem is by observing
cooperative biological communities in nature. One
finds that cooperation among biological organisms is
achieved through a mechanism called indirect reci-
procity [6]. This mechansim for cooperation relies
on some shared notion of trust. In this work we aim
to facilitate communal cooperation in a peer-to-peer
file sharing network called Tribler, by introducing
a mechanism for evaluating the trustworthiness of
agents. We determine a trust ranking of all nodes in
the network based on the Monte Carlo algorithm es-
timating the values of Google’s personalized PageR-
ank vector. We go on to evaluate the algorithm’s
resistance to sybil attacks, whereby our aim is for
sybils to be assigned low trust scores.
2 Introduction
2.1 Historical Perspective
With the ever-growing expansion and widespread accep-
tance of the internet, the field of research in distributed
systems is gaining evermore importance. In its simplest
definition, a distributed system is a group of different
processors working together on a common task. These
processors have a shared state, operate concurrently and
can fail independently. The primary advantages of a
distributed system over a centralized system are scalability,
fault-tolerance and lower latency. There are however some
drawbacks to the decentralized nature of these networks.
The most notable being resource-management.
A particular example of distributed systems are peer-to-
peer networks, also known as P2P networks. A peer-to-peer
network allows computers to communicate without the need
for a central server. Peer-to-peer file sharing refers to the
distribution of digital media over a P2P network, in which
the files are located on individuals’ computers and shared
with other members of the network. P2P software was the
piracy method of choice in the early 2000s with software
programs such as LimeWire, Gnutella and the BitTorrent
client being the most prominent applications [1]. A Supreme
Court decision in 2005 led to the closure of many of these
sites for illegally sharing copyrighted material, mostly music.
In a peer-to-peer file sharing network agents up- and down-
load files over the network to one another in a cooperative
manner, whereby an agent that is holding a file (or at least
a part of it) can offer it to other agents that require it,
through actions called seeding and leeching. Seeders are
those who offer upload bandwidth while leechers are the
agents that download the data. While these types of sys-
tems have many advantages over the standard client-server
model, they do have one fundamental problem: users have
an obvious incentive to download, i.e. to leech, but no
inherent incentive to seed. This results in behavior called
lazy freeriding.
In order to avert freeriding and to incentivize its users to
participate in the network reciprocally, early file sharing
networks such as the BitTorrent protocol employ a mecha-
nism called tit-for-tat [2]. Tit-for-tat is a highly effective
strategy in game theory for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
in which an agent cooperates first and then replicates it’s
contender’s previous actions. In practice, this works as
follows. Peers in the BitTorrent network have a limited
number of upload slots to allocate. An agent will begin
by exchanging upload bandwidth for download bandwidth
with a number of its peers. If one of these peers turns out
to be a leecher, i.e. does not reciprocate, it will be choked.
This means the agent will discontinue it’s cooperation and
assign the corresponding upload slot to another randomly
chosen peer in a procedure known as optimistic unchoking.
However, we find that defecting is the dominant strategy in
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the Prisoner’s dilemma [3]. The agents’ inability to coor-
dinate and build expectations of their counterparts ensures
that everyone will be worse of than if they had collabo-
rated. This is also known as the tragedy of the commons.
Agents do not keep a memory about their peer’s reliability
which enables such lazy freeriding and other types of un-
cooperative behavior. There is no mechanism with which
peers can be evaluated based on their previous reliability
or trustworthiness as nodes in the network and hence every
new transaction entails the risk of the partner node defect-
ing. This leads us to the main research question, the TU
Delft’s Blockchain Lab focuses their study on: Is it possible
to incorporate a digital counterpart to trust in a distributed
network with no central authority?
2.2 Trust
Trust is a rather abstract concept which is oftentimes
understood more on an intuitive level as opposed to having
a clear-cut definition. Thus there are many different
possible definitions of trust. In this project we chose to
adopt one of the definitions of trust given in Vandenheuvel’s
Mathematics of Trust [4].
Definition 2.1 (Trust).
Two agents (a trustor and a trustee) have a trust relation-
ship if the trustor is uncertain about the outcome of the
trustee’s actions and can only rely on previously developed
expectations to predict these.
Trust is a necessary catalyst for cooperation in networks and
there have been many different approaches to facilitating
trust relationships in distributed systems. Companies like
eBay, Uber or Airbnb utilize reputation systems based on
ratings. Agents in these networks leave publicly accessible
reviews of eachothers’ collaborators after each transaction.
These reviews are stored and maintained by a central
authority, so that no fraud can take place. Based on these
reviews the network generates reputation systems for all
nodes. Agents then decide who to interact with based on
this reputation, thereby incentivizing cooperative behavior
of all participants [5].
The TU Delft’s Blockchain Lab aims to take this trust sys-
tem a step further, by removing the central authority that
manages the network and its reputation system. In order
to gain an understanding of how this is possible we look
into the sociological aspects of cooperative networks among
people in the real world. Nowak, Martin A. discuss what
psychological mechanisms engender cooperative networks in
the animal kingdom, namely kin selection, direct reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection
[6]. DBL is researching the possibility of incorporating a
mechanism of indirect reciprocity into their p2p file sharing
network called tribler [7].
2.3 Trustchain
In order to build such a digital trust mechanism into
a perfectly decentralized network, a distributed storage
space, or ledger, is required. The tools most commonly
used for this purpose are Blockchains. Blockchains are data
structures that utilize cryptographic primitives such as
public-key cryptography to maintain a consensus on data,
stored on many different processors in a distributed system.
Transactions between agents in the network are grouped
in blocks which, in turn, are interlinked by a hash chain.
Blocks are created by ”miners”, nodes in the network
that collect and group transactions. In order to obtain a
block, the miner needs to solve a crpytographic hash puzzle
through a protocol known as proof-of-work. If conflicting
states occur, the chain forks, and miners contribute to the
chain they believe is the valid one. At some point, one
chain will overtake the other and all miners transition to
that chain. This point is determined by a certain number
of blocks by which one chain surpasses the other, which is
based on a predetermined lower bound for the probability
of a dishonest miner single-handedly overruling the current
chain. The resulting chain of blocks is therefore immutable
as well as fraud-proof[9].
Blockchains however have a major drawback that the
classical client-server model does not have. Consensus is
maintained by miners receiving information about all trans-
actions that have transpired in the network. As the network
grows, the risk of transaction broadcasts not reaching cer-
tain miners increases, which makes maintaining a global
consensus more and more difficult. This fundamentally
limits the scalability of such blockchain based networks.
Another scalability issue the current proof-of-work con-
sensus mechanism causes, lies in the fact that it requires
agents to wait for a certain number of blocks to exceed
a transaction’s block before this transaction is deemed
trustworthy. In pursuing a more scalable alternative, the
blockchain lab has developed their own type of distributed
ledger, called TrustChain. TrustChain is what’s known as
a fourth-generation blockchain.
In TrustChain, all network participants maintain their own
chain of transactions. There is no mining and no global
consensus. The TrustChain maintains records of all inter-
actions between peers in the network, in respective blocks.
Each block contains data about an individual transaction
between two peers, such as the respective up-and download
values, the peers’ public keys and signatures as well as
block sequence numbers and respective hashes. Blocks are
linked to one another through hash pointers. Each block
is thereby connected to two preceding and two succeeding
blocks, i.e. each block is contained in the chains of both
transaction partners. This results in many different chains,
each corresponding to a single agent’s transaction history,
see Figure 1[8].
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Figure 1: Trustchains of different network participants
When two agents interact with one another, they make their
respective chains visible to each other and may even store
information about each other’s chains as well. This struc-
ture is strongly scalable, both in the number of agents in
the network as well as in the number of transactions per
agent. Moreover, the trustchain does not maintain a global
consensus. This means that double-spends are not actually
prevented, as they are in traditional blockchains. However,
they are made detectable and can subsequently be penal-
ized through peer rejection or even by banning dishonest
nodes from the network. Thereby fraudulent activity is not
actually prevented, but strongly disincentivized.
2.4 Problem Description
As discussed in subsection 2.1 (Historical Perspective) the
long standing issue of tribler is digitizing a method for
evaluating the trustworthiness, or reputation, of agents
in a network. Such a mechanism is meant to deter lazy
freeriders, i.e. agents that purposefully contribute no or
very little resources to the network, but at the same time
utilize the network for their own benefit.
There have been many different approaches to this problem,
however a viable and accurate solution has yet to be found.
The first reputation system introduced in Tribler was
BarterCast [11]. BarterCast was based on the voluntary
reports of agents about their own transactions. However, an
inherent problem with the BarterCast system is the issue of
deliberate misreporting of transactions, by agents that have
made overall negative contributions to the network. After
BarterCast, another accounting mechanism was introduced:
DropEdge, which is an implementation of BarterCast on a
subset of the graph, ignoring all nodes that are interested
in receiving some data.
In this project we aim to implement a mechanism which
enables the ranking of nodes in the tribler network based
on their respective reputability. Reputatbility should be a
measure of the impact a node has on the network. This
means that nodes with a low or negative net contribution
made to the network should be ranked lower than more al-
truistic nodes. When a node is looking to query an overlay
for a file to download, it will generate this ranking and de-
termine which agent in the swarm it should engage with to
maximize the likelihood of a successful transaction and a
subsequent reciprocal relationship. We present a number of
requirements that this trust mechanism should satisfy.
1 Personalization
Trust is personal. Two different agents in the network
may have a completely different perception of their
neighbours’ trustworthiness. This means that an algo-
rithm computing a trust ranking of nodes must depend
on the node from whose perspective the trustworthiness
is determined.
2 Locality
It’s been observed that in the BitTorrent network most
peers share a one hop relationship In [10]. Therefore
we restrict the amount of indirection in between con-
tributing and reciprocating peers. This makes sense in
a social context as well. A node may trust one of its
peers, and by transitivity of trust, it will also trust this
peer’s trustees, although less. A third or fourth hop will
reduce this amount of transitive trust to a minimum.
3 Incrementality
The underlying graph structure of the network con-
tinually evolves as transactions take place and new
blocks are added to agents’ trustchains. Trust rankings
therefore develop continuously as well. Recomputing
these trust rankings from scratch is prohibitively ex-
pensive. We require our algorithm to be able to update
the trust rankings incrementally as more information
arrives over time. We update the trust rankings in
batches, either in time intervals, or by the amount of
information that has become available.
A very popular existing algorithm that is used to rank the
importance of pages on the world wide web is Google’s
pagerank algorithm. In the context of the internet, we find
that the importance ranking by google is an equivalent con-
cept to our idea of trustworthiness in p2p networks. Given
the resemblance of the graph structures of both the web and
the tribler network, the use of the pagerank algorithm for
the assessment of agents’ trustworthiness suggests itself.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 The Model
In order for us to model the Tribler network in a graph
structure we look into the number of different models defined
in [12] There, the concept of an ordered interaction model
is introduced, which we will briefly recap.
Definition 3.1 (Ordered Interaction Model).
Define an ordered interaction model as M = 〈P, I, aω〉,
which is uniquely determined by the following 4 sets:
• P : a finite set of agents.
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• I a finite set of interactions.
• a : I → P × P , a function mapping each interaction to
the participants involved .
• ω : I × P → R≥0, a function mapping an interaction
and an agent to the contribution made by the agent in
that interaction.
For any p 6∈ a(i) it must hold ω(i, p) = 0. Note that ω also
allows for negative values, in case of leeching. For any agent
the interactions involving this agent must be completely or-
dered temporally.
From this mathematical framework we now derive the
graph structure on which we will instantiate the trust mech-
anism.
Definition 3.2 (Interaction Graph). Given an ordered in-
teraction model M = 〈P, I, a, ω〉, we define an interaction
graph G = (V, E) by the sets
• V = {vp|p ∈ P}
• E = {(vp, vq)|∃i ∈ I, a(i) = (p, q)}
Here, the network is given by a directed graph (V, E) with
a set V of N vertices or nodes and a set E of edges. The
vertices correspond to the agents, or peers, in the network.
The edges reflect interactions between agents.
The edge weights for an edge (vp, vq) ∈ E in this graph are
determined by
ω((vp, vq)) :=
∑
{i∈I:a(i)=(p,q)}
ω(i, p)
Edges are unidirectional and weighted, whereby the weight
ω(a, b) of an edge connecting vertices a and b corresponds
to the net data flow between two peers, i.e. the difference
between up- and downloaded data. Two vertices are only
ever connected by at most one directed edge. The direction
of the edge is determined by the absolute value of the net
data flow in between two nodes, i.e. if node a has a surplus
of uploaded data over node b then the edge connecting the
two will point towards a. With each transaction, edges are
either added to the graph or modified in their weight. This
means that, if for instance the absolute difference of up- and
downloaded data changes, such that the node that had pre-
viously seeded more than leeched, now finds itself in ”debt”,
then the direction of the edge is changed. An example of an
interaction graph can be found in Figure 2, with agents P,Q
and R.
3.2 Interaction Graphs in Tribler
As we have already discussed in 2.3, interactions in the
Tribler network are recorded in a distibuted storage
Figure 2: Ordered Interaction Model
structure called the TrustChain. In the TrustChain, every
block corresponds to an interaction. We can visualize the
trustchain with what [12] refers to as an ordered interaction
graph, were every node corresponds to a block in the
trustchain and the edges represent the hash pointers in the
chain. However, in order for us to obtain a trust mechanism
for agents in the Tribler network by running the pagerank
algorithm, we need to transform our trustchain graph
into an interaction graph. In order to do this, we take a
closer look at the blocks contained in the tribler blockchain.
Blocks are tables made up of the following columns:
• type
• tx
• public key
• sequence number
• link public key
• link sequence number
• previous hash
• signature
• block timestamp
• insert time
• block hash
The tx column contains a dictionary of four keys: total up,
total down, up and down. These values correspond to
the data shared between the two nodes involved in the
transaction. The total up and total down values represent
the accumulated data flow in between the two nodes
over the entire time. The public key value represents
the public key of the requester of the transaction while
the link sequence number is that of the responder. The
sequence number is the numbering of the blocks in the chain
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of the requester and the link sequence number then rep-
resents the numbering of the block in the responder’s chain.
In the interaction model, every node in the graph corre-
sponds to a public key in the network. We retrieve all nodes
in the graph from the public key and link public key fields
of all trustchain blocks. We then acquire the edges from the
up and down values of the ”tx” dictionary. We aggregate
these over all transactions involving the two agents and then
determine the weight and subsequently the direction of the
edge in between two nodes. This is repeated for all pairs of
nodes until we have generated an entire interaction graph.
We did this with the help of the Python sqlite3 module.
4 The Algorithm
4.1 PageRank
Traditionally, PageRank is computed through a method
called the Power Iteration. The Power Iteration is deter-
mined in the following way. Let n denote the number of
nodes in the network. Define the n × n hyperlink matrix
P such that if i is a node with k outgoing edges with
respective edge weights ωij , for k nodes j connected to i
then Pij =
ωij∑k
l=1 ωil
and Pij = 0 if j is not connected to
i at all. The entries of P can then be interpreted as the
probability of a random walk of the network hopping from
node i to node j, given that it has reached node i. If a page
has no outgoing links at all, it is called a dangling node and
the transition probability is then spread evenly among all
nodes, i.e. Pij =
1
n .
This can be intrepreted as a random surfer on the graph
hopping from node to node along the edges and then
teleporting to a random node in the graph with some reset
probability c at every stop. It will also teleport once it
reaches a dangling node.
Thus, the PageRank is defined as a stationary distribution
of a Markov chain whose state space is the set of all nodes,
and its transition matrix is given by
P˜ = (1− c)P + c
(
1
n
)
E
where E is a n× n matrix with all values equal to one and
c ∈ (0, 1) is the reset probability. This matrix is stochastic,
aperiodic and irreducible and therefore there exists a unique
vector pi such that
P˜ pi = pi, with pi1 = 1
This vector pi is then called the PageRank vector. The
values pii can be interpreted as the probability of a random
surfer landing on page i in an infinite random walk of the
network. It denotes the importance of nodes in the graph.
In our case this importance to the network can also be
interpreted as the nodes’ trustworthiness.
The Power Iteration can be computed in an iterative man-
ner. One begins with pi0(i) =
1
n for all nodes i = 1, ..., n.
The values are then computed iteratively as follows.
pik+1(i) =
1− c
n
+
∑
{j | (j,i)∈E}
(
pik(j)
outdeg(j)
)
c
This iteration is finished, once the difference of the consec-
utive values passes a certain treshold ε, or the number of
iterations reaches a certain predetermined upper bound.
The PageRank values can be personalized to a particular
seed node. In that case the pagerank values of all nodes in
the network depend on the initial choice of the seed node.
They are, so to speak, the pageranks determined from the
perspective of the seed node. In that case the transition
matrix is given by
P˜ = (1− c)P + c
(
1
n
)
E˜
whereby E˜ is a matrix of only zeros, with a column of ones
at the i-th place, with i being determined by the seed node.
The iterative computation then follows a slightly different
formula. For the pagerank of the seed node it is given by
pik+1(i) = 1− c+
∑
{j | (j,i)∈E}
(
pik(j)
outdeg(j)
)
c
and for all other nodes
pik+1(i) =
∑
{j | (j,i)∈E}
(
pik(j)
outdeg(j)
)
c
4.2 Monte Carlo Methods for PageRank
approximations
In [13] it is observed that the end-point of a random walk
of the network that starts from a random page and can be
terminated at each step with probability 1 − c, appears to
be a sample from the distribution of pi. Thus we find a
random walk based algorithm for estimating the pagerank
values of a network. By repeating the random walks of the
graph many times, an estimate of pij for j = 1, ..., n can
be given by the number of times a run crosses j, divided
by the total number of nodes crossed by all random walks.
This method for approximating PageRank is known as the
Monte Carlo method.
The Monte Carlo method for estimating the PageRank vec-
tor has several advantages over the power iteration method.
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Figure 3: Monte Carlo based PageRanks
Let’s recall the three requirements we defined for the trust
algorithm in Problem Description. Personalization, locality
and incrementality. The Monte Carlo algorithm satisfies
all three of these requirements and we will show that it
provides a good estimation of PageRank after relatively few
iterations.
Monte Carlo algorithms are motivated by the following for-
mula
pi =
1− c
n
1T [1− cP ]−1 = 1− c
n
1T
∞∑
k=0
ckP k
which suggests a simple way of sampling from the PageRank
distribution. In [13] 5 different algorithms to estimate the
personalized pagerank, motivated by the equation above, are
introduced. We chose to implement the fourth algorithm.
We run a simple random walk (Xt)t≥0, m times starting at
the seed node in the network that either stops with proba-
bility c at every node reached, or when a dangling node is
reached, else it transitions along the edges as determined by
matrix P . The length of these random walks varies around
an average of 1c . According to the equation above the nodes
reached by these random walks then should approximate the
distribution of pi. Figure 3 is a visual representation of this
particular Monte Carlo method. Let Wij be a random vari-
able denoting the number of times the random walk (Xt)t≥0
reaches node j given that it originated at node i. Formally,
P(Wij = x) = P
([ ∞∑
t=0
1{Xt=j}
]
= x|X0 = i
)
Then, the estimator for pi obtained by this algorithm is given
by
p¯ij =
[
m∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
W
(l)
ij
] m∑
l=1
n∑
i,j=1
W
(l)
ij
−1
where W (l), l ≥ 1 are independent random variables of the
same distribution as Wij .
Theorem 1 in [13] states that the estimator p¯ij converges to
pij as the number of random walks goes to infinity. Thus p¯i
is a consistent estimator. Additionally, it is shown that this
particular Monte Carlo method achieves an error of about
1% for the highest 12 nodes. Thus, the defined p¯i’s are ac-
curate approximations of the actual PageRank values pi. In
[14] it was shown that this estimator is, in fact unbiased
and sharply concentrated around its expected value. We
now evaluate this algorithm based on the three requirements
listed in 2.4.
1 Personalization
Recall the primary idea behind the PageRanks of nodes
was for a node seeking to acquire data, to evaluate the
peers in its vicinity. There is no central authority which
it can query for these values and it cannot necessar-
ily rely on other agents sharing information about their
previous transactions with other nodes honestly. There-
fore, the node must determine these values by itself. We
adjust the Monte Carlo method such that all random
walks originate from the same node, i.e. the down-
loader, also known as the seed node. The PageRanks
are then computed analogously, but from the ”perspec-
tive” of the seed node. The alternative PageRank vec-
tor obtained through this method is called personalized
PageRank.
2 Locality
Recall the second requirement we had for this algo-
rithm. Nodes do not query the entire network for data.
They direct their focus primarily towards other nodes
within their vicinity. This is due to transitive trust
declining rapidly over an increasing number of hops
through the network. The Monte Carlo algorithm en-
ables exactly this, by applying random walks with rela-
tively high reset probabilities, e.g. values in between 0.2
and 0.5 we find that the PageRanks are more focused
around a node’s immediate neighbourhood as opposed
to weighting all nodes alike.
3 Incremental Computation
The tribler network does not stay still. Accounts
are made as well as deleted and new transactions
transpire continuously. Edges are added and removed
or have their weight changed through transactions.
Consequently the PageRank values fluctuate and
have to be recomputed everytime the graph structure
changes. It is simply unsustainable to recompute all
random walks from scratch everytime the network is
updated. Small alterations made to the graph, such
as the addition or deletion of individual nodes and/or
edges, are unlikely to impact a significant proportion
of random walks in the network. Therefore it’s just not
necessary to recompute all random walks everytime
the graph changes.
Only those random walks that pass through an edge
or node that has been altered, need to be reviewed.
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And they only need to be recomputed starting at the
last node they reached before they passed the modified
region (edge or node). Let’s say a node is removed from
the network. All random walks that reach a node, the
removed node was connected to, are then recomputed
starting at the that node. If an edge is removed then
all random walks that reach the source node of the
removed edge are recomputed starting at the source
node. The same goes for when an edge is added. This,
of course is an alternative that is computationally far
less expensive than a rerun of the entire algorithm
everytime an edge is added or removed.
It should be noted here that it is far more common
for new edges and nodes to arrive rather than existing
edges and nodes to leave the network.
In [14] the following two theorems about the expected
amount of additional update work for arriving and disap-
pearing edges, were proved.
Theorem 4.1. Let (ut, vt) be the t
th random edge that is
added to the graph and let Mt be the random variable that
determines the number of random walk segments that subse-
quently need to be updated. Finally, let R denote the number
of random walks and li the length of the i
th random walk. It
then holds
E[Mt] ≤
R∑
i=1
liE[
piut
outdegut(t)
]
Additionally, it holds
E[
piut
outdegut(t)
] =
1
t
So it is
E[Mt] ≤ 1
t
R∑
i=1
li
For each random walk segment that needs to be updated, we
compute a random walk from the corresponding source node.
Hence, we can expect 1c work per recomputed random walk.
Now, we can sum up the expected amount of update work
over m edge arrivals and we obtain
E[
m∑
t=1
Mt] ≤ 1
ε
R∑
i=1
li
m∑
t=1
1
t
Seeing as the harmonic series is bounded from above by the
natural logarithm, we finally obtain
E[
m∑
t=1
Mt] ≤ 1
ε
R∑
i=1
li lnm ≈ R
ε2
For the counterpart of edges leaving the graph we have
the following result.
Theorem 4.2. For a network with m edges, if a randomly
chosen edge leaves the graph, then the expected amount of
work necessary to update the walk segments is at most
1
ε
R∑
i=1
li ≈ R
ε2
From this we learn that the cost to keep the PageRank ap-
proximations updated is only logarithmically larger than the
cost of the initial computation and that the marginal update
cost decreases with later edges making it increasingly cost
effective over time, enabling real-time updates at a later
stage.
5 Implementation
We wrote a Python class implementing the algorithm.
The code can be found in https://github.com/
alexander-stannat/Incremental-Pagerank/blob/
master/Page_{}Rank2.py
5.1 Unit Testing
In order to determine whether our algorithm runs correctly,
we ran a set of 5 different unit tests. In the last one, we gen-
erated a random graph with number of nodes in between 2
and 10000 and 2 edges per node. We then computed the
Monte Carlo pageranks as well as the results of the power
iteration. We compare the results and assert that the two
vectors do not diverge by more than 10%. Thereafter, we
update the graph by randomly adding and removing edges
and nodes, and then update the values of the Monte Carlo
PageRanks incrementally, as discussed in 2.4. We also re-
compute the values of the power iteration and compare the
two values again. We find that the values never diverge by
more than 10% for any of the randomly generated graphs.
5.2 Convergence Testing
Next we determine the rate at which the Monte Carlo
algorithm converges to its final values for different sets
of graphs and input parameters. Again, we randomly
generate a graph, with the number of nodes ranging from
2 to 100. We begin with the random generation of the
graph. This works analogously to our previous example
above in 5.1. We determine the values of the Monte
Carlo pagerank for reset probabilities 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5. We
plot the accuracy of the method relative to the power
iteration against the number of random walks ranging from
10 to 500. We obtain the following results given in Figure 4.
Figure 4 depicts the accuracy of our Monte Carlo com-
putation of the pageranks relative to the power iteration
method. We can clearly see a downward trend in the
error values over the number of random walks. It is pretty
obvious that the Monte Carlo PageRanks become more
accurate as the number of random walks through which
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Figure 4: Accuracy of the Monte Carlo PageRanks by num-
ber of random walks
they are computed, increases. We see that the error values
for small numbers of random walks can be as high as 20%
and go down to under 5% which are reasonably accurate
values as discussed in 5.1. We also see that the reset
probability has no effect on the accuracy, which is also
expected. One should remark the high variance, we can
find in these values, as seen in the jaggedness of the curves.
This is due to the probabilistic nature of the algorithm, i.e.
the random walks. This means the accuracy can vary quite
significantly for any number of random walks and any reset
probability.
Next, we determine whether the reset probability of the
random walks has any impact on the accuracy of the
algorithm. We plot three error values of the Monte Carlo
method for different numbers of random walks (10, 100, 300)
and obtain the values in Figure 5.
We see in Figure 5 that the accuracy of the Monte Carlo
PageRanks does have a slight dependence on the reset prob-
ability as well as the number of random walks. For reset
probabilites that are further away from the bounds, 1 and
0, we find that the error values tend to be larger. This makes
sense as well. Large reset probabilities generate short ran-
dom walks, which are less volatile than long ones. Therefore
there is less room for probabilistic fluctation, making them
more accurate. Analogously, small reset probabilites gener-
ate very long random walks that don’t reset at all, unless
they reach a dangling node. This means the visit times
of these random walks are more stable because they cover
the entire graph, and therefore we obtain a smaller error.
It should also be added that this effect is weakened as the
Figure 5: Accuracy of the Monte Carlo PageRanks by reset
probabilities
number of random walks increases.
5.3 Sybil Resistance
In this section we discuss the properties of sybil resistance
of the Monte Carlo method. We randomly generate a graph
for an honest region, analogously to the method discussed
in 5.1. The honest region consists of 500 random nodes
and 2000 randomly generated interconnecting edges each
weighted from 0 to 10. We also generate a sybil region made
up of 1000 nodes which is even more densely connected
than the honest region, with 10 edges per node. In Figure
6 the honest region is given by the green nodes and light
blue edges, while the sybil region has yellow nodes and pink
edges. The seed is node 0 and lies in the honest region.
Next, we add attack edges connecting the honest and the
sybil region in the graph. We compute the Monte Carlo
PageRanks of the given graph for every number of attack
edges in between 0 and 500. There are several attack edges
that are directly connected to the seed node 0. The Monte
Carlo algorithm is run with 200 random walks and several
different reset probabilities. For each of those PageRank
vectors we create a list ”ordered nodes”, which orders
the nodes in the graph according to their pageranks in
a descending order. Using this ordered vector, we deter-
mine the ROC curve and the area under the ROC curve
as a measure of sybil resistance of the Monte Carlo method.
ROC curves are used to show the connection between sensi-
tivity and specificity for every possible cut-off for diagnostic
tests. In addition, the area under the ROC curve gives an
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Figure 6: Image of a network split into an honest region and
a sybil region
idea about the benefit of using the test in question. In our
case, it is determined as follows. We let the cut-off point
run from the first to the final node. For each, we label the
nodes beneath it as sybils and the nodes above as honest.
The abscissa of the ROC curve is then given by the false
positive rate for each cut-off point and is plotted against
the ordinate given by the corresponding true positive rate.
We determine the ROC curve for each number of attack
edges and a set of different reset probabilities (0.1, 0.3, 0.5,
0.7). We obtain the plots given in Figures 7, 8, 9.
Next, we determine the area under the ROC curve for every
ROC curve computed. The area under the ROC curve
(AUROC) of a test can be used as a criterion to measure
the test’s discriminative ability. We obtain the graphs in
Figures 10, 11, 12.
We can see in the plots above that the area under the ROC
curve decreases monotonely for random walks with reset
probability 0.1. This does not hold for shorter random
walks. When we think about this, we find that it makes per-
fect sense. Given the size of the graph and the length of the
random walks, most nodes in the honest network are never
visited by any random walk. Hence they have a pagerank of
0. This means they are at the bottom of the ordered nodes
vector and therefore labelled as sybil for almost all cut-off
points, i.e. we have a very large proportion of false nega-
tives. This does not hold for the random walks with reset
probability of 0.1, because those random walks travers the
entire graph. This leads to a slightly misleading conclusion.
Overall, we get a false positives rate of in between 0.35 and
Figure 7: ROC curve for 0 attack edges and reset probability
0.3
Figure 8: ROC curve for 250 attack edges and reset proba-
bility 0.3
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Figure 9: ROC curve for 499 attack edges and reset proba-
bility 0.3
Figure 10: Area under the ROC curve by number of attack
edges for various reset probabilities
Figure 11: Proportion of false positives by number of attack
edges for various reset probabilites
Figure 12: Proportion of false negatives by number of attack
edges for various reset probabilities
Figure 13: Area under the ROC curve with nodes of PageR-
ank 0 removed
0.45. The shorter the random walks, the lower this rate.
We also find that for short random walks this rate actually
decreases with the number of attack edges. This is because
a larger number of attack edges enables random walks that
have entered the Sybil region, to also escape it.
In order to obtain results that are more representative of
the method’s sybil resistance, we remove all nodes with
PageRanks of exactly 0 from the ordered nodes vector.
With this, we obtain the results given in Figures 13, 14, 15.
• Area under the ROC Curve
We find that the area under the ROC curve increases
quite significantly after the 5th attack edge is added.
This is because the 5th attack edge is the first attack
edge that is directly connected to the seed node. Ther-
after it decreases moderately with the number of attack
edges. For the remaining reset probabilities this does
not seem to be the case. Instead the area under the
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Figure 14: Proportion of false positives with nodes of PageR-
ank 0 removed
Figure 15: Proportion of false negatives with nodes of
PageRank 0 removed
ROC curve increases with the number of attack edges
connecting the sybil and the honest region. This is due
to the reasons we discussed above.
• False Positives
False positives are sybil nodes that are considered hon-
est according to their pageranks. We find that for the
reset probability of 0.1 the number of false positives
increases abruptly after the 5th attack edge is added,
again for the same reasons as mentioned above. The re-
maining reset probabilities exhibit rather constant num-
bers of false positives. The overall average of false pos-
itives for the algorithm in this network lies at around
35%.
• False Negatives
False negatives are honest nodes that are marked as
sybils by the algorithm. We find again that the monte
carlo algorithm with a reset probability of 0.1 exhibits
a jump in false negatives at around 5 attack edges. The
remaining PageRank values seem to be quite constant
with a minor upward trend with the number of attack
edges added. The overall average here is at around 30%.
We find that these values are not really satisfactory and
that therefore the Monte Carlo PageRank algorithm is not
practically sybil resistant. This makes sense to us. Random
walk based PageRank algorithms are rarely sybil resistant,
simply due to the random walks that they are based on.
It is easy for a random walk to end up in the sybil region
and there is no mechanism to prevent this in our current
implementation. In the future we may want to implement
a mechanism to enhance our algorithms sybil proofness, for
instance by identifying attack edges.
6 Application to the Tribler Net-
work
We now apply our implementation of the Monte Carlo algo-
rithm to the Tribler network.
6.1 Running the Algorithm
First we generate a graph of the Tribler network. We gener-
ate the graph as discussed in 4.2. There are 667124 blocks
in our data set. This corresponds to a graph of 289 nodes.
We first create our graph for all but 5 nodes and all but 20
edges. Then we compute the corresponding PageRanks. We
update the graph by adding the missing nodes and edges
to the graph. Then we update our random walks and re-
compute the PageRank values. In both cases we compare
our values with the Power Iteration values and time the en-
tire process. We employ our Monte Carlo algorithm with
300 random walks and a reset probability of 0.3. The al-
gorithm has a runtime of 14.1710000038 seconds and we
obtain following error values: 0.3978275442360459 for the
euclidean norm and 0.19806694712219172 for the supremum
norm. This is not quite as accurate as our previous results
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for smaller graphs and we conclude that there must be some
scalability issues in the algorithm.
6.2 Incremental Update
Now, we update our graph by adding the missing edges
and nodes. We recompute the Power Iteration PageR-
anks as before, but recompute the Monte Carlo PageR-
anks not from scratch, but by updating the necessary ran-
dom walks, as discussed in 4.2. The algorithm has a run-
time of 5.17000007629 seconds and we obtain the error val-
ues of 0.46419964703781746 for the euclidean norm and
0.19798405911144684 for the supremum norm. These val-
ues are slightly larger than the ones we obtained from the
initial computation, but still reasonable.
7 Conclusion
In this project, we implemented an incremental personalized
PageRank algorithm for ranking nodes in a peer-to-peer
file sharing network, called Tribler using the Monte Carlo
method. We chose algorithm 4 from [13] with a set of
standard random walks on a directed graph with weighted
edges. The graph of the tribler network was generated by
”flattening” the blockchain’s blocks into a unidirectional
graph with edge weights corresponding to the net data flow
in between nodes.
We found that for relatively small graphs, the algorithm
is quite fast (14 seconds for the initial computation and
5 seconds for the incremental updates). We find however
that the error values tend to increase with the size of the
network and for the initial computation of the pageranks
of the tribler network we obtain an error of almost 40%
and 47% for the incremental updates. One should note
here that the application of the PageRanks is primarily
to rank nodes based on their trustworthiness in order to
select the most trusted nodes to interact with. This means,
the PageRanks of lower-ranked nodes are not as relevant
as the PageRanks of the highly-ranked nodes. An agent
interested in a transaction will generate their trust ranking
and most likely choose a peer among the top 5 ranked
nodes. This means that some of the inaccuracy is negligible
so long as the ranking of nodes at the top of the ranking is
approximately correct and in the right order. Therefore the
algorithm is still applicable and returns useful results for
the Tribler application, despite the high error values.
We inspected the rate of convergence of the algorithm and
found that the accuracy of values, relative to the power
iteration’s values improves exponentially by the number
of random walks and shrinks down to values close to 3%
for a network consisting of 15 nodes. As the network
grows these values increase as well. This is due to small
inaccuracies accumulating by the iterations and thereby
growing to ever larger values. We suspect that choosing
the networkx library’s approximation of the power iteration
based PageRanks may not have been the best relative
reference for our Monte Carlo PageRank. An example
illustrates the possible inaccuracy of the Power Iteration’s
values. If we choose a network with a completely isolated
seed node then we expect a PageRank vector consisting
only of zeros and a single value of one. However, the
networkx power iteration returns a vector with many very
small values for most nodes other than the seed node.
This perfectly illustrates where the large error values we
obtained originated from. The networkx power iteration
PageRanks have an innate inaccuracy, which accumulates
and increases as the number of edges multiplies and the
graph grows.
Finally, we tested the algorithm for its sybil resistance. We
generated an honest region and a sybil region connected by
a varying number of attack edges. We found that for an
honest region with 500 nodes and a sybil region of 1000
nodes and a number of attack edges increasing up to 500
edges the algorithm exhibited a rather large percentage of
false positives and negatives and a relatively low ROC curve.
This was to be expected, simply due to the random walk
based nature of the algorithm. In future work we may look
into optimizing this algorithm to account for sybil attacks.
8 Outlook
Within the scope of this project we deliberately neglected
a number of concerns and possible additions to the trust
algorithm, which we list here now. In the coming weeks and
months we will tackle some of these issues.
• Sybil Resistance
We have seen that our algorithm is quite susceptible
to sybil attacks, especially to those in which Sybil
regions manage to create attack edges connecting
directly to the seed node. Currently, we see the issue
lie in the fact that it is too easy for Sybils to gain
trustworthiness throught the transitivity of trust in
the network. In the future we might want to look into
making some additions to our current implementa-
tion in order to increase our algorithms sybil resistance.
• CPU Hogging
Running the Monte Carlo algorithm 5 seconds straight,
everytime we incrementally update our values, occupies
the CPU for too long periods at a time. Our current
system uses a single core 100% for this time span
everytime it updates the trust values. These batch
computations completely starve any other processes
running on a user’s CPU. This is problematic and
should be replaced by an alterative system load profile,
replacing the batch computations with continuous
updates of the trust values of all agents in the network.
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• Accumulation of Errors
We have seen in 5.2 that the algorithm’s first trust
ranking entails a rather high error value. As the
network continues to evolve, edges and nodes are
added and removed and the trust ranking is updated
incrementally in batch computations. Every update of
the PageRank vector adds a new error to the already
existing one and error values accumulate over time.
In order to prevent errors from getting too large, the
PageRank must be recomputed from scratch every so
often. Before deploying this algorithm in the Tribler
network it needs to be determined when and how
regularly such resets must take place.
• Relay Nodes
The Tribler application is based on the Tor overlay net-
work, in order to facilitate anonymous up- and down-
loading. This means that data transferred between
two parties in the network is actually rerouted through
many other nodes, acting as encryption layers. The cur-
rent implementation of the algorithm treats the action
of relaying equivalently to downloading and then up-
loading the same amount of data, oftentimes leading to
an increase in trustworthiness. This should not be the
case. Relaying should be treated separately from reg-
ular seeding and leeching and therefore also differently
evaluated.
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